military alliances have not always been effective at military decision-making. However, NATO has been able to avoid this pitfall because it has an integrated military organization and the North Atlantic Treaty at its disposal.
Thus with the presence of American leadership, an expanded military structure including NATO, Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), could conceivably lead to the complete pacification of an area stretching from Vladivostok to Vancouver. In such a scenario the collective defensive capabilities of the participating states would form the basis for a collective security arrangement within this area. This would seem to be the only feasible way of finally disposing of the stigma arising from failed attempts at collective security in the past.
In the day to day developments since this ambitious scenario was first launched it has made no progress. How can this be explained?
In the first place, NATO and the oscE have been seen as competing organizations. One was either in favour of the oscE (and did not trust the Western NATO) or one was in favour of the NATO (and did not trust the panEuropean OSCE). As a result the opportunity for the synergetic fusion of a legitimating institution (OSCE) and an effective military organization (NATO) was lost. Recently Russian policy has returned to its attempts to expand its sphere of influence via the osCE, while at the same time ?rA'ro's role in the organization has again been marginalized. When this is taken in conjunction with NA'ro's refusal to expand and admit new members it becomes apparent that a dividing line between East and West still exists and that in that sense the Cold War has not ended yet.
Secondly, the existing structures could not cope with recent outbreaks of violence, especially in the Balkans and Caucasus. To be sure, the osCE had established conflict resolution and human dimension mechanisms designed to deal with intra-state conflicts in the former Soviet bloc. However, these various negotiating methods, missions, and new institutions proved effective only in mitigating limited conflicts in which the parties involved remained reasonable and where the situation did not escalate into one of protracted and bloody warfare.? Together with the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy, the oscE became one of the first victims of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. All the osCE proved capable of doing was sending observer missions to monitor the escalation of the conflict.
Finally, the renationalization of foreign policy by the OSCE member states undermined the organization. Indeed all the multi-national organizations involved in the Yugoslav crisis were to varying extents disabled by the conflicting interests of their respective member states. Attempts by Western countries to deny Russia a monopoly on peace-keeping activities (read:
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